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Abstract 
The correlation between interest rates and corporate bond yield spreads is a well-known 
feature of structural bond pricing models. Duffee (1998) argues that this correlation is weak 
once the effects of call options are removed from the data; a conclusion that contradicts the 
negative correlation expected by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). However, Elton et al. (2001) 
point out that Duffee’s analysis ignores the effects of the tax differential between U.S. 
Treasury and corporate bonds. Canadian bonds have no such tax differential, yet, after 
controlling for callability, we find that the correlation between interest rates and corporate 
bond spreads remains negligible. We also find a significant negative relationship for callable 
bonds with this relationship increasing with the moneyness of the call provision. These 















  1A Pure Test for the Elasticity of Yield Spreads 
1. Introduction 
Structural models
1 for the valuation of corporate bonds assume an asset-based default 
process with default occurring once the stochastic value of the firm’s assets hits a default 
threshold. In these models the threshold is conveniently expressed as the relation between 
the market value of the firm's assets to its debt. One of the more notable predictions of 
structural models is that credit spreads –the bond yield spread between a risky bond and a 
near maturity riskless bond- are negatively correlated to the return on risky assets and 
changes in default-free interest rates, with the former generally proxied by the return on a 
well-diversified market index, while the later is proxied by the change in a near maturity 
Government bond rate.  
The objective of this paper is to once again revisit the theme of the pricing of corporate 
credit spreads. There are two important grounds for doing so. First, despite extensive 
empirical examination the expected negative correlations predicted by the structural models 
are not necessarily present in risky bonds of all credit classes, maturities and markets (e.g. 
Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Duffee, 1998; and Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). Second, 
more recent theoretical papers have questioned the underlying assumptions of the simple 
structural models which lead to these conclusions (e.g. Duffee, 1998; Elton et al. 2001; 
Campbell and Taksler, 2003; Ericsson and Renault, forthcoming). 
The view that credit spreads are negatively related to asset returns is consistent with the 
stylized facts evident in the pricing of risky bonds by market participants: credit spreads are 
higher for bonds of declining credit quality; they increase when news negatively affects 
underlying corporate asset values and when there is a lack of liquidity. The other conclusion 
- of a negative relation to the riskless rate – is, however, not so apparent and has remained 
the subject of extensive empirical verification. Ceteris paribus, under risk-neutral valuation, 
an increase in the riskless rate implies a higher expected future value for the firm's assets 
relative to the default threshold, and a lower risk-neutral probability of default. This 
  2ultimately results in a lower credit spread. While Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), who 
pioneered this line of testing using Moody’s indexed U.S. bond yields, find a strong negative 
relationship between yield spreads and Treasury yields, Duffee (1998) argues that since most 
bonds in Moody’s index are callable bonds, the negative yield spread – riskless rate relation 
could instead be due to the negative relationship between the yield spread attributed to the 
call option and the riskless interest rate. Consideration of the effect embedded options in debt 
has on credit spreads should also be considered with other recent findings: Campbell and 
Taksler (2003) show that idiosyncratic firm-level volatility affects credit spreads, leading to 
the conclusion that firm-level volatility should also affect any embedded options in debt 
value, while Hackbarth et. al. (forthcoming) also argues that credit spreads should be 
positively correlated with the volatility of cash flows from firm assets. 
While recent studies mount a strong case for the impact liquidity has on the risky yield 
spread (Ericsson and Renault, forthcoming; Chen et al., forthcoming), more importantly for 
this study, Elton et al. (2001), point out that Duffee’s (1998) analysis ignores potential tax 
effects in his tests
2. They study the components of yield spreads for U.S. investment-grade 
corporate bonds, which by definition have low default risk and so should be more sensitive 
to interest rate effects. In conclusion, Elton et al. warn against ignoring the tax differential 
when studying corporate bond yield spreads, and both Duffee (1998) and Elton et al. (2001) 
make a case for a pure test based on bond data with no call options and tax effects.  
In this paper, we use a database of Canadian, investment-grade, corporate bond indices 
devoid of tax effects, since Canadian corporate and government bonds, unlike U.S. bonds, 
are subject to the same tax treatment. Canadian government bonds are also highly liquid and 
not being a reserve currency are not actively sought by international investors, notably 
foreign central banks and financial institutions, whose market actions have the potential to 
distort pricing along the term structure. This database also contains a unique provision 
allowing for identification of callable and noncallable indices. Yet, our results are similar to 
those found by Duffee (1998). The negative yield spread – riskless rate relation found in 
  3Canadian callable bond indices is largely due to the call premium, while this relationship is 
negligible for noncallable bonds. This result is robust for a variety of empirical models, and 
still holds for an inflation-adjusted test. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section introduces 
previous studies and their empirical models and describes the unique characteristics of the 
Canadian bond market. Section 3 outlines the data and regression methodology and presents 
the empirical results. In section 4, an alternative test using default rates is undertaken. Finally, 
the summary and conclusion are offered in section 5. 
 
2. Previous Studies 
The two factor valuation model of Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) is an extension of the 
closed-form solution of Merton (1974), where default is a function of the value of the firm at 
maturity, to a simple continuous-time valuation framework that allows for both default and 
interest rate risk. This structural model captures the stochastic nature of interest rates, where 
for simplicity the dynamics of the interest rate are explained using a simple term structure 
model based on Vasicek (1977). Other perspectives include the reduced-form models of 
Jarrow, Lando and Turnbull (1997) and Duffie and Singleton (1999) where the payoff upon 
default is specified exogenously, The asset level which triggers default can also be imposed 
endogenously by having the shareholders optimally liquidate the firm as in Leland (1994), 
Leland and Toft (1996) and Anderson and Sundaresan (1996). As noted by Giesecke (2006) 
these models do not consider the way information is revealed over time, and implicitly 
assume that investors can observe the inputs to the model definition of default. However, 
investors do not have complete information about the inputs to the model definition of 
default; in particular the asset value of a firm is hard to directly observe. Consequently in her 
model, termed a first passage default model, investors learn over time the location of the 
barrier, since it must lie below the observable historical low of assets to date if the firm has 
not already defaulted. 
  4In the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model an Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 
regression analysis is applied to both absolute yield spreads (the difference between the risky 
and riskless yields) and relative yield spreads (the ratio of the risky to riskless bond). Using 
Moody’s corporate bond yield indices, they find a significant negative yield spread – riskless 
rate relationship for absolute spreads and a stronger negative relationship for relative spreads. 
Longstaff and Schwartz conclude that this empirical result supports their two-factor model 
corporate bond-pricing model.
3 However, Duffee (1998) points out the failings of this 
approach owing to the construction of Moody’s index, which uses both callable and 
noncallable bonds. For callable bonds, higher interest rates imply a lower chance that the 
issuer will exercise the call option. Thus bondholders will demand a lower yield for this call 
provision, which will result in an overall decrease in the bond yield spread. To accommodate 
the call features present in most U.S. corporate bonds he constructs a noncallable bond index 
and regresses spread changes on changes both in the short yield and in a term structure slope 
variable, for both callable and noncallable bonds. Interestingly, he finds that the negative 
relationship between credit spread and interest rate is much weaker once the call option 
effects are removed from the data. Specifically, changes in yield spread on callable bonds are 
found to be strongly negatively related to changes in Treasury yields, while on the other hand, 
for noncallable bonds, he finds a weak, although still negative relation. Therefore the 
negative relationship found by Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) can be attributed to either the 
default premium or call premium.    
In a related study using Australian Eurobond, Batten, Hogan and Jacoby (2005) find 
results consistent with the implications of the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) theoretical 
model, with actual and relative credit spreads both negatively related to changes in the All 
Ordinaries Index (a proxy for the asset factor in the Longstaff and Schwartz model), and 
with changes in Australian Government bond yields as well (a proxy for the interest rate 
factor in the Longstaff and Schwartz model). Their contribution lies in providing an insight 
into why the relative measure tends to be statistically more significant than the alternate 
  5measure based upon the difference. They do so by introducing a simple theoretical 
framework that explains the effect of callability on the interest-rate factor and that by 
construction, relative spreads should bring about a stronger yield spread – interest rate factor 
relation,  
Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) identify more factors that may determine changes in credit 
spreads. For example, Duffee (1998) omits important factors such as the Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) asset factor in his regression analysis. Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
combine the explanatory variables offered by Longstaff and Schwartz and Duffee, in 
addition to a convexity term and firm leverage variable. They conclude that credit spread 
changes are primarily driven by local supply/demand shocks, which are independent of both 
credit-risk factors and liquidity factors. Their regression model is so far the most 
comprehensive in the extant literature and forms the basis for a number of recent models. 
These accommodate time varying volatility and autocorrelation in spread changes through 
GARCH and ARMA specifications and more recently through the incorporation of liquidity 
based variables (Ericsson and Renault, forthcoming; Chen et al., forthcoming). Note that 
autocorrelation in spread returns may be due to illiquidity of that particular bond in 
secondary markets. 
In this paper, we apply each of the above seminal regression models using Canadian, 
investment-grade, corporate bond indices. The strength of our study lies in using Canadian 
corporate bonds, which are devoid of the tax effect. Studies using U.S. bond data cannot 
avoid these tax effects. Canada’s Doomsday call provision also allows identifying callable 
and noncallable indices. The effects of taxes and the uniqueness of the Canadian Doomsday 
call provision are discussed in turn. 
 
3. The Uniqueness of Canadian Bond Data  
3.1 Tax Effects 
Canadian bond data enables controlling for tax effects arising from the different tax rates, 
  6which apply to U.S. corporate and Treasury bonds. Duffee (1998) notes that U.S. corporate 
bonds are subject to taxation at the federal, state, and local levels, while U.S. Treasury bonds 
are subject only to federal tax.
4 To determine the potential effect of these distortions on credit 
spreads, Elton et al. (2001) decompose yield spreads (calculated from estimated zero curves) 
for U.S. investment-grade corporate bonds into three components: default-risk premium, 
systematic-risk premium, and a state-tax premium. Their analysis shows that the state-tax 
premium is significantly more important relative to the default-risk premium (36.1 percent 
versus 17.8 percent of the yield spread for 10-year A-rated bonds, respectively). Since 
Canadian corporate and Government of Canada bonds are subject to an identical tax rate 
then tax effects should not play a role in the estimated relation for Canadian corporate bonds 
and their spreads. 
  Another advantage of using the Canadian bond data relates to both the level of 
coupons and the tax system. Constantinides and Ingersoll (1984) show that a dynamic bond 
trading strategy, aimed at minimizing tax liabilities, produces bond prices significantly 
higher than when using a buy-and-hold strategy. They attribute this difference in value to the 
tax-timing option. Jordan and Jordan (1991) provide strong evidence supporting the 
existence of a tax-timing option for U.S. Treasury bonds. 
  Prisman, Roberts, and Tian (1996) demonstrate that, given the different tax treatment 
for bonds in Canada, the tax-timing option in Canada is unlikely to have an economic value 
to bond traders. In addition, they show that when the range of coupon rates in the portfolio 
contracts, the value of the tax-timing option will be even lower. Historically, SCM (Scotia 
Capital Markets) imposed constraints on the range of coupon rates permitted for corporate 
bonds to be included in its indices.
5 These constraints were designed to eliminate the coupon 
level effect from the yield spread of the included bonds over the yield on Government of 
Canada bonds, so that this spread is as close as possible to the true yield spread. Given these 
constraints, and the tight range of coupon rates at the present, the value for the tax-timing 
option for these indices is expected to be even lower, and its impact on the estimated relation 
  7minimal. 
  Tax effects may also explain the divergence in empirical results for credit spreads 
where the risky bond is a Eurobond, or similar offshore security. For example, Wagner, 
Hogan and Batten (2005) adopt the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) two-factor regression, 
extended for correlated spread changes and heteroskedasticity to investigate Deutschemark-
denominated Eurobonds. They find that while changes in spreads are significantly negatively 
related to the term structure level, contrary to structural theory, the proxy for the asset value 
does not yield a significant negative contribution, while for long bond maturities there is a 
significant positive relation The authors interpret this result as being consistent with (i) 
portfolio rebalancing or substitution effects (where long maturity high quality bonds are 
traded for stocks), and (ii) a market risk premium on corporate bonds, which dominates 
default risk. This later conclusion is consistent with Elton et al. (2001) where a time-varying 
premium for bearing risk in capital markets may yield a systematic risk premium for 
corporate bonds with the sensitivity of credit spreads to systematic risk factors tending to 
increase for longer maturities and lower credit quality. 
  However, these authors do not consider the different tax treatment that applies to 
domestically issued government bonds as opposed to Eurobonds from the international 
investor viewpoint. In most countries Eurobonds are able to be issued by resident 
corporations in such a way that they avoid with-holding tax provisions otherwise payable to 
their international investors. These provisions normally allow for the exemption to the 
payment of with-holding tax when the issue is “publicly available” and “widely distributed”. 
The legal test for this varies for each country but normally relies upon whether the issue is 
listed on an exchange and the face value of each specific bond. Low face values enable the 
bond to be widely circulated and therefore “widely distributed”. These same exemptions are 
not necessarily available to foreign investors who buy domestic corporate and government 
bonds. Consequently the overall effect on credit spread pricing is not clear-cut since it would 
depend on the extent that foreign investors were involved in the domestic government bond 
  8market purchases, although the opportunities for distortions in pricing are evident.  
In addition, credit spreads on corporate bonds may also be compromised by the ability 
for some local firms to credit enhance their international as well as domestic debt through 
the use of dedicated cash-flow from exports. Specifically, Durbin and Ng (2005) investigate 
emerging markets for “sovereign ceiling effects,” which says that a firm is no more 
creditworthy than its government. Contrary to expectations they find evidence which refutes 
the presence of a sovereign ceiling, for local firms that have substantial export earnings 
and/or a close relationship with either a foreign firm or government.  
 
3.2 The Canadian Doomsday Call Provision 
To control for callability, Duffee (1998) suggests stratifying data by forming two 
portfolios for each rating category, one consisting of only callable bonds, and the other of 
noncallable bonds. However, there may be a selection bias in callability related to risk 
differences between callable and noncallable bonds. For example, Bodie and Taggart (1978) 
claim that firms with more growth opportunities are more likely to issue callable bonds. If 
the firm's expectations of growth are confirmed, its shareholders can avoid sharing this good 
fortune with bondholders by simply having the firm's managers call the entire bond issue. 
Berk, Green, and Naik (1999) show that the systematic risk of asset returns is related to the 
firm's growth opportunities. This implies that stratifying bond data based on callability may 
create two risk classes within each rating category. 
Canadian corporate bonds have a feature that allows for mitigating the potential 
selection bias associated with callability. Most Canadian corporate bonds issued from 1987, 
carry a call provision called the “doomsday” call provision. This call provision makes it 
possible to control for callability for some bonds, facilitating the study of a set of corporate 
bonds broader than just noncallable bonds. Similar to the U.S. make-whole call option, a 
doomsday call provision sets the call price at the maximum of the par value of the bond, or 
the value of the bond calculated based on the yield on a Government of Canada bond (with a 
  9matching maturity) plus a spread (the doomsday spread).
6 Thus, a make-whole call price is 
calculated in the same manner as that of the doomsday call, but the bond’s remaining cash 
flows are discounted with the yield of comparable maturity treasury security plus a 
contractually specified “make-whole premium”. 
Below, we demonstrate that BBB-rated Canadian bonds are always traded with yield 
spreads much wider than the doomsday spread set in their call provision. Thus, the exercise 
of the doomsday call for BBB-rated bonds will rarely cause financial damage to the 
bondholders, and these bonds may be considered economically noncallable.
7
  To substantiate this feature of Canadian corporate bonds, we collect doomsday 
spreads for all bonds carrying the doomsday call for each month during the 01:1993-12:1999 
period, from the Financial Post Corporate Bond Record. Since in this study we focus on 
SCM's long-term bond indices, we limit our sample to data corresponding to bonds with a 
maturity greater than ten years. We stratify our data by credit rating, and for every month, we 
calculate the average and standard deviation of doomsday spreads across bonds within each 
rating category. Since data for the AAA bonds are unavailable for most of the sample period, 
we obtain statistics only for AA, A, and BBB rated bonds. 
  To determine the moneyness of the doomsday call provision, one must compare the 
doomsday spread to the yield spread. In Figure 1, for each rating category, we plot the yield 
spread on the corresponding long-term index (S), the average doomsday spread (µ), the 
average doomsday spread plus one standard deviation (µ+σ), and the average doomsday 
spread plus two standard deviations (µ+2σ).
8 In Panel A of Figure 1, we see that for AA-
rated bonds the yield spread is lower than the average doomsday spread in a large number of 
cases, and it is almost always lower than the doomsday spread plus one standard deviation. 
Similarly, in Panel B of Figure 1 we see that the yield spread of A-rated bonds is often lower 
than the average doomsday spread, and in a significant number of cases it is lower than the 
doomsday spread plus one standard deviation. 
  Based on this 7-year sample it is clear that the probability of the doomsday call being 
  10in the money for AA- and A-rated bonds is substantial, with that of AA-rated bonds being 
significantly larger. In Panel C of Figure 1 we see that the yield spread of BBB-rated bonds 
is always significantly higher than the average doomsday spread plus two standard 
deviations. Thus, based on our sample, we conclude that the probability of the doomsday call 
being in the money for a BBB-rated bond is virtually zero, and thus BBB-rated bonds are 
economically noncallable. 
  
***Insert Figure 1 here*** 
  
Mann and Powers (2003) study U.S. bonds with make-whole call provisions. They 
analyze 318 bonds carrying this provision, issued between October 1995 and September 
1999. Similar to our findings for Canadian doomsday bonds, Mann and Powers show that at 
issuance the make-whole call option for U.S. bonds is out of the money. Although this is true 
for all ratings, lower-rated bonds are deeper out of the money.  
Note that the history of the make-whole call provision in the U.S. is significantly shorter 
relative to that of the doomsday call in Canada (first U.S. issue is from 1995 while first 
Canadian issue is from 1987). If the make-whole or doomsday call option is initially issued 
out of the money, the bond yield spread has to shrink over time for the option to move in the 
money. In other words, the bond credit rating has to ameliorate or the overall market 
conditions have to change significantly. Given the longer history of this option in our 
Canadian data, we indeed find that the doomsday option for our higher-rated Canadian bonds 
is sometimes in the money.  
The presence of the doomsday call has important implications for studying the yield 
spread - riskless rate relation. For a standard call provision carried by most U.S. corporate 
bonds, lower riskless rates imply a higher probability of the issuer calling the bond. For the 
doomsday call of BBB-rated bonds, the effect of lower riskless rates is defused by the call 
price floating upwards. Thus, the existence of the doomsday call provides a useful 
  11instrument for the isolation of the effect of default risk and its significance.  
  This result allows us to control for callability for the long-term BBB-rated SCM bond 
index, during the later period of our 25-year sample. To determine the duration of this period, 
for each month during the 01:1993-12:1999 7-year period we count the number of corporate 
bonds issued with a doomsday call provision, the number of bonds issued with a standard 
call provision, and the number of noncallable bonds, as reported in the Financial Post 
Corporate Bond Record. In Figure 2 we plot the proportion of each of the above categories 
calculated with respect to the total number of bonds within each month. As most Canadian 
corporate bonds issued after 1986 either are noncallable or carry a doomsday call, in Figure 
2 we see that the proportion of doomsday-call bonds increases considerably during the 7-
year period, from 22.82 percent in 01:1993 to 47.48 percent in 12:1999. At the same time, 
the proportion of bonds carrying a standard call provision decreases dramatically, from 41.03 
percent in 01:1993 to 8.25 percent in 12:1999. The proportion of noncallable bonds 
fluctuates between 34.46 percent and 47.29 percent. 
  
***Insert Figure 2 here*** 
  
The above proportions are calculated for the entire Canadian corporate bond universe as 
covered by the Financial Post Corporate Bond Record. One can expect the proportion of 
long-term doomsday bonds, with over ten years to maturity, to be much higher compared to 
that of medium-term and short-term bonds. Since most Canadian corporate bonds are issued 
with 10 to 20 years to maturity, it is more likely that the number of newly issued short-term 
and mid-term bonds in SCM's mid-term and short-term indices is dominated by the number 
of seasoned bonds. Thus, for those indices, it is more likely that most bonds are those 
originally issued prior to 1987 with the standard call provision. 
  CANSIM reports that as of 01:1987, the weighted average maturity for SCM's long-
term AA, A, and BBB indices, is 14.61 years, 14.80 years, and 13.34 years, respectively. 
  12Note that these maturities represent the maturity of the last Canadian corporate bonds issued 
with a standard call provision prior to 1987. Thus, four years or so later, the “average'” bond, 
issued originally with a standard call provision, is expected to become a medium-term bond, 
with maturity below ten years. Since these are averages, to be safe, we feel that it is 
reasonable to wait eight years instead, and to assert that starting 01:1995, the vast majority of 
bonds included in SCM's long-term bond indices carry a doomsday call rather than a 
standard call provision. 
  Following the above discussion, we conclude that SCM's long-term bond indices are 
the indices suitable for our study, and thus we discard the mid-term and short-term indices. 
Furthermore, we conclude that the 01:1995-07:2001 period, in which these long-term indices 
consist mainly of bonds carrying a doomsday call, is an adequate estimation period to 
control for the callability of the BBB-rated index. 
  In summary, analyzing yield spreads using the SCM Canadian corporate bond indices 
has the advantage of controlling for callability and effects arising from taxation. Such an 
analysis provides a clearer picture of the role of the default-risk adjustment in measuring the 
sensitivity of investment-grade bond yield spreads to changes in the riskless rate. 
 
4.  Data and Method 
4.1. Data 
Our sample is based on month-end yield-to-maturity data from the Scotia Capital 
Markets (SCM) investment-grade Canadian corporate bond indices, reported by Statistics 
Canada (CANSIM). This index does not enable an accurate assessment to be made of 
outstandings or trading volume for use as a proxy for liquidity. The SCM corporate bond 
indices are stratified into four different investment-grade rating categories: AAA, AA, A, and 
BBB. In this study, we use SCM's long-term corporate bond indices (motivated in section 1 
for callability control), reported for the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data for the AAA 
index are available only until March 1993, as no bonds fit this category for the later period. 
  13A long-term i-rated corporate bond index, i=AAA, AA, A, BBB, consists of all bonds in 
SCM's i-rated corporate bond universe, with remaining terms to maturity greater than 10 
years. 
Our yield spreads for these long-term indices are calculated with respect to the constant 
maturity, long-term Government of Canada index, reported by CANSIM. Following 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), to proxy firm assets' returns we use the (continuously 
compounded) monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index.
9
Table 1 reports the summary statistics for the time series of absolute and relative yield 
spreads stratified by credit rating. Similar to the statistics reported by Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) for their U.S. data, the means of both absolute and relative yield spreads 
monotonically increase as credit quality decreases for all indices. The same is true for the 
standard deviation of both yield-spread measures. 
 
***Insert Table 1 here** 
4.2. Regression Methodology 
Our focus is on testing the three regression models introduced in the first section, 
namely the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) two-factor model, Duffee’s (1998) term-structure 
model and Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) comprehensive model. For all the models that 
follow, we estimate the coefficients by OLS and a combined autoregressive and GARCH 
(1,1) model. Financial time-series are well known to exhibit volatility clustering, a time-
varying variance of the innovations. In this sense heteroskedasticity in the regression 
residuals may reduce the estimation efficiency but is commonly overcome through the 
GARCH (1,1) specification. Since previous research in this area uses OLS, we first run OLS 
regressions for comparison reasons. Also, using the Lagrange multiplier (LM) test and the 
Portmanteau Q-test to our data, we examine their properties. We find that a combined 
autoregressive and GARCH (1,1) model better fits our data. 
The first model tested is based on Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), where the absolute 
  14yield spread is defined as the difference between the yield on the relevant SCM index and 
that of the constant maturity, long-term Government of Canada index. Their model for the 
absolute spreads is given by: 
Sab Yc Iε ∆=+∆+ +                          (1) 
where    is the monthly change in the absolute yield spreads,   is  the  monthly 
change in the constant maturity, long-term Government of Canada yield, which proxies 
changes in the riskless rate. I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index, 
which proxies firm assets’ returns. 
S ∆ Y ∆
The second model tested is the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) model but with relative 
spreads instead of absolute spreads. The relative yield spread is defined as the ratio between 
the yield on the relevant SCM index and that of the constant maturity, long-term 
Government of Canada index. In Table 3, we report our result for the following Longstaff 
and Schwartz (1995) relative spread regression: 
Rab P Yc Iε ∆=+ + +                          (2) 
where  R ∆   is the monthly change in relative yield spreads, and PY  is  the  monthly 
percentage change in the constant-maturity long-term Government of Canada yield, which 
proxy’s changes in interest rates. I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 
index, which proxies for firm asset return. 
Duffee (1998) uses a regression approach different from that of Longstaff and Schwartz 
(1995). He regresses spread changes on changes both in the short yield and in a term 
structure slope variable. Kamara (1997) presents evidence that the slope of the riskless term 
structure is positively related to expected economic growth. Harvey (1997) presents similar 
results for Canada. This finding implies a negative relation between default risk and changes 
in the slope of the riskless term structure. Following Duffee (1998), we estimate the 
following regression model for every index: 
                  01 2 T bill S Y Slope β ββε                              (3)  − ∆= + ∆ + ∆ +
  15where   is the monthly change in the absolute yield spreads,  S ∆ T bill Y − ∆  is the monthly change 
in the yield on a three-month Government of Canada treasury bill, and  Slope ∆  is the monthly 
change in the spread between the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada yield 
and the three-month treasury bill yield. 
Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) findings indicate that monthly changes in firm-
specific attributes are not the driving force in credit-spread changes. Thus we also run the 
following regression for each index: 
                      ∆S = β0 + β1∆YLT + β2 (∆YLT)
 2 + β3∆Slope + β4I + ε,                       (4) 
where ∆YLT is the monthly change in the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada 
yield and the remaining variables are as defined above.  
Following Fridson, Garman and Wu’s (1997) prediction, we estimate the following 
regression for each index: 
                      01 2 , LT R SY β βπβ ε ∆= + ∆+ ∆ +                                (5) 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the yield spread, ∆YLT,R is the monthly change in the real 
yield on the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index, ∆π is the monthly 
change in the consumer-price index (CPI) that proxies the inflation rate.  
 
5. Empirical Results  
The results from applying the three regression models introduced in the first section, 
namely the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) two-factor model, Duffee’s (1998) term-structure 
model and Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) comprehensive model are now reported. 
5.1  Longstaff and Schwartz’s (1995) two-factor model. 
In Table 2, we report the OLS estimates for the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) regression 
models. They use both absolute and relative spreads in their analysis.
10 Panel A of Table 2 
outlines the estimates for our entire sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. 
Corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision dominate the data during this sample 
  16period. Thus, due to Duffee’s (1998) warning, we expect the impact of callability on the 
results to be significant for that period. 
 
***Insert Table 2 here*** 
 
The results for regression model (1) are in agreement with the results of Longstaff and 
Schwartz (1995) for their U.S. bonds. The estimated coefficients for b are negative and 
statistically significant for all indices during the 08:1976-07:2001 estimation period. As in 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), the magnitude of the estimates of b is economically 
significant for the evolution of yield spreads, and the coefficient b monotonically decreases 
with credit quality. Also in agreement with Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), Panel A of Table 
2 reports that the estimates of c are all negative and statistically significant. The coefficient c 
is also found to decrease monotonically with credit quality, and is economically significant. 
This supports the importance of Longstaff and Schwartz's (1995) asset factor, i.e., ceteris 
paribus, higher firm values result in lower probability of default and consequently lower 
yield spreads. 
However, drawing the conclusion that default yield is negatively related to interest rate 
simply based on the above result is premature. Following Duffee’s (1998) results, we believe 
that this result is due to the negative impact of callability on the estimated relationship. To 
test this hypothesis, we apply regression model (1) to all indices for the 01:1995-07:2001 
period, in which our long indices are expected to be dominated by bonds carrying the 
doomsday call. 
This allows us to control for callability for the BBB index. Recall that for BBB-rated 
bonds the doomsday call will always be out of the money, making them economically 
noncallable. This leaves the default term as the only factor potentially affecting the sign of b 
for the BBB index. Based on their findings, which are similar to our results for the entire 25-
year sample period, Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) conclude that the interest-rate factor is 
  17more important for lower-rated bonds. Given that the BBB index is the lowest-rated index in 
our sample, one can expect the default factor, manifested by the interest-rate factor in 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), to have the strongest impact on the yield spread - riskless 
rate relation estimated for this index. 
  Panel B of Table 2 reports our results for the 01:1995-07:2001 period. Our estimated 
coefficients b for the BBB index is statistically insignificant.
11 This result implies no relation 
between credit spreads and the riskless rate for the economically noncallable corporate bonds 
rated BBB. This result indicates that the default factor, which represents Longstaff and 
Schwartz's interest-rate factor, is trivial for BBB-rated bonds, for which it is expected to be 
most important within our sample. Contrasting these results with those reported in Panel A of 
Table 2 for the same index, it becomes clear that what drives the negative sign of b is the 
negative impact of the callability factor. 
  In Figure 1 we show that the probability of a call for the doomsday call provision in 
the AA- and A-rated indices is significant. Thus, one should expect the doomsday call for 
these indices to induce a negative yield spread - riskless rate relation, as in the case of bonds 
carrying the standard call provision.
12 This negative relation is confirmed by the results 
reported in Panel B of Table 2. Our estimated coefficients b are negative and statistically 
significant for the economically callable AA- and A-rated indices during the 01:1995-
07:2001 estimation period.  
Figure 1 also demonstrates that the probability of a call is significantly higher for AA-
rated bonds compared with A-rated bonds. Thus, one may expect the negative impact of the 
callability term on the sign of b to be greater for the AA index than for the A index. The 
results reported in Panel B of Table 2 support this hypothesis. Above, we saw that for the 
entire 25-year sample period the estimated coefficient b monotonically decreases with credit 
quality. For the 01:1995-07:2001 period this monotonicity is reversed in line with the 
moneyness of the doomsday call. 
Finally, the estimates for the coefficient c for the 01:1995-07:2001 period in Panel B of 
  18Table 2 are still all negative and statistically significant. In general, the coefficient c 
decreases with credit quality, and is similar in magnitude to that estimated for each index for 
the entire 25-year sample period. This clearly shows that Longstaff and Schwartz's (1995) 
asset factor is robust. 
  Next, we examine the results for relative yield spreads. Panel A of Table 3 reports the 
estimates for our 25-year sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 period. Recall that data 
during this period are dominated by callable bonds, carrying a standard call provision. Like 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), we find stronger support for the negative relation, i.e., 
higher absolute t statistics for b and regression R
2’s in regression model (2).  
  
***Insert Table 3 here*** 
  
Compared with the results reported in Table 2, the results reported in Panels A and Panel 
B of Table 3 for regression model (2), indicate that the t statistics for the coefficient b are 
always higher when one uses the relative spread. Also, the regression R
2’s experience a 
significant increase when regression model (2) is applied, which suggests that this regression 
model introduces a negative structure into the data. Focusing on the economically 
noncallable BBB index during the 01:1995-07:2001 period, it is interesting to note that 
although we find no yield spread - riskless rate relation for absolute spreads, when relative 
spreads are used instead, b becomes statistically negative.
13
Instead of interpreting the result to be evidence in support of the negative spread-rate 
relationship, we analyze the regression structure first and find that the more significant 
negative relation for relative spreads is born out of a mathematical definition rather than a 
reflection of economic relationship.  
Let R denote relative spread, S denote the absolute spread, and Y denote the riskless rate. 
Then by definition:  Y
S Y R + = . We find the following relationship between the sensitivity to 
interest rate of absolute spread and that of relative spread. 
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  Finally, the estimates for the coefficient c under regression model (2) for the entire 
25-year sample period (Panel A of Table 3) and for the 01:1995-07:2001 period (Panel B of 
Table 3) all remain negative and statistically significant. As in the analysis of absolute 
spreads, the last result for relative spreads demonstrates that Longstaff and Schwartz's (1995) 
asset factor is robust. 
 
5.2 Duffee’s (1998) Model 
   Table 4 outlines the estimates for the Dufee (1998), regression model (3). In some 
cases, we find that our SCM data set is characterized by the autoregressive nature of the OLS 
residuals of regression model (3). This may be a function of liquidity in the underlying 
Canadian bond markets, since Wagner, Hogan and Batten (2005) suggest - with respect to 
German Eurobonds- that dependence in spread changes may result from a low liquidity in 
the bond markets investigated as well a relatively illiquid corporate bond market compared 
to the Government bond market. In our case, the order of the autoregressive process for the 
residuals varies across the indices. To determine the correct autoregressive order, we apply a 
stepwise autoregression method. In a number of cases, where the OLS residuals follow an 
autoregressive process, they also exhibit non-constant volatility consistent with a GARCH 
(1,1) process. In those instances, we apply a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure for a 
combined autoregressive model and a GARCH (1,1) model. When the OLS residuals only 
  20follow an autoregressive process, we apply the Yule-Walker method. Finally, when the OLS 
residuals are homoskedastic and do not follow an autoregressive process, we simply use 
OLS to estimate regression model (3).
14
Panel A of Table 4 outlines the estimates for our entire sample, covering the 08:1976-
07:2001 25-year period. Recall that corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision 
dominate the data during this sample period. As expected, yield spreads are negatively 
related to both the three-month bill yield and the slope of the riskless term structure for all 
ratings. In general, both level and slope coefficients monotonically decrease with credit 
quality. These results agree with Duffee's (1998) results for his callable U.S. bond portfolios. 
 
***Insert Table 4 here*** 
  
Panel B of Table 4 reports our results for the 01:1995-07:2001 period. For the 
economically callable AA- and A-rated indices, both level and slope coefficients are negative 
and statistically significant. Recall that BBB-rated bonds are economically noncallable 
during this period. Our estimated level and slope coefficients for the BBB index are both 
statistically insignificant. Applying regression model (3) to his U.S. noncallable bond data, 
Duffee still finds both level and slope coefficients to be significantly negative, although 
weak. He attributes this result to the coupon level effect. Our results support this assertion. 
Since the coupon bias is not prevalent in our SCM data, the negative sign for both slope 
coefficients disappears. 
  Recall that Figure 1 demonstrates that the probability of a call is significantly higher 
for AA-rated bonds compared with A-rated bonds. The results reported in Panel B of Table 4 
are in line with this hypothesis. For the entire 25-year sample period, the estimated slope 
coefficients monotonically decrease with credit quality, whereas for the 01:1995-07:2001 
period, this monotonicity is reversed in line with the moneyness of the doomsday call. Thus, 
applying Duffee's (1998) regression analysis to our data strengthens the hypothesis that 
  21callability drives the negative sign of both level and slope coefficients. 
 
5.3. Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) Comprehensive Regression 
  Next we establish if the previous results are affected by model specification by 
applying Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) comprehensive regression (4). Since our data 
consists of bond indices, whereas they use firm level data, we omit some firm-specific 
explanatory variables used in their regression analysis. As in the previous sections, we apply 
a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure for a combined autoregressive model and a 
GARCH (1,1) model. Table 5 outlines the estimates for regression model (4). Again, in some 
cases, we find that our SCM data set is characterized by the autoregressive nature of the OLS 
residuals of regression model (4). 
 
***Insert Table 5 here*** 
 
 In general, we obtain results consistent with our previous regressions. Panel A of Table 
5 outlines the results for our entire sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period, 
during which corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision dominate the data. We find 
that yield spreads are negatively related to Government of Canada yields for all bond indices, 
and also to the return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index.  
  Panel B of Table 5 reports our results for the 01:1995-07:2001 period. For AA- and A-
rated bonds, the yield spread is still significantly negatively related to Government of 
Canada yields. For BBB-rated bonds, which are economically noncallable during this period, 
the yield spread – Government yield relation is still insignificant. These results provide 
additional support for our conclusion that callability dominates the observed negative 
relationship between credit spread and riskless rate.
15 In the absence of an economically 
viable call option, the correlation between credit spread and riskless interest rate is 
insignificant. 
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5.4. Yield Spreads and Real Interest Rates 
  Fridson, Garman and Wu (1997) suggest that an empirical investigation of the default 
risk – riskless rate relation should be based on the real interest rate, rather than nominal rates 
that are the standard in yield spread studies. They argue that if the company’s revenues are 
fully adjusted with respect to inflation, its effective cost of capital is related to the real 
riskless rate rather than the nominal rate. As the real riskless rate increases, the firm’s cost of 
short-term debt increases as well, and its available cash flow decreases. This will hurt the 
firm's ability to issue new long-term debt, and expected default rates will rise. 
In agreement with their hypothesis, Fridson, Garman and Wu (1997) find a significantly 
positive relationship between default rates and real riskless rates. In the context of the 
current paper, this result implies a positive yield spread – real riskless rate relation when 
callability is controlled for. In this section, we first examine the relationship between yield 
spreads and the inflation rate and real riskless rate. Then we test the most comprehensive of 
the above models for yield spreads, namely the Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) model, using 
real, rather than nominal, Government of Canada yield. Both tests show that the yield spread 
of callable bonds is negatively related to the nominal riskless rate. However, when the real 
riskless rate is used instead, this significant negative correlation disappears. Since the 
decision to call is based on the level of nominal rates rather than real rates, the yield spread 
attributed to callability should be negatively related to nominal riskless rate and unrelated to 
the real rate. This result presents further evidence for our conclusion that call risk dominates 
the observed negative yield spread – nominal riskless rate relation. 
 
5.5. Inflation, Real Interest Rate and Yield Spreads 
Following Fridson, Garman and Wu’s (1997) prediction Equation (5) was also estimated 
with the results reported in Table 6, Again, in some cases, we find that our SCM data set is 
characterized by the autoregressive nature of the OLS residuals of regression model (5). As 
  23in the above sections, we apply a maximum-likelihood estimation procedure for a combined 
autoregressive model and a GARCH (1,1) model.     
 
***Insert Table 6 here*** 
 
Panel A of Table 6 reports that yield spreads are negatively related to both the inflation 
rate and the real government yield for all callable indices. It is interesting to note that the 
coefficients of both explanatory variables are very similar in magnitude. We interpret this as 
evidence that the influence of riskless term structure on yield spreads is due to mainly 
nominal riskless rates. Based on a Wald test we fail to reject the hypothesis that β1 = β2. Thus, 
we can rewrite regression (5) as: 
                   ε π β β + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ ) ( , 1 0 R LT Y S                        (7) 
where (∆π + ∆YLT,R) is the monthly change in nominal government yield. Thus, these results 
are in line with the fact that the moneyness of the call provision is based on the level of 
nominal rates rather than real rates, which will induce a negative relationship between the 
yield premium attributed to callability and the nominal riskless rate. Not surprisingly, for the 
economically noncallable BBB-rated bonds during the 01:1995-07:2001 period the 
relationship is insignificant with both the inflation rate and the real rate (Panel B of Table 6). 
Note that for the same period, for the economically callable AA- and A-rated bonds the 
relationship is significantly negative with both variables.  
 
5.6. Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) Model with Real Rates 
To check that the above analysis with the real interest rate is not affected by model 
specification, we test the most comprehensive regression model - Collin-Dufresne et al.’s 
(2001) - with real government rates. Table 7 outlines the results of this estimation. In Panel A, 
which reports the results for the entire sample, the only significant factors are the term 
structure slope changes and the stock index return. The interest rate factor is not significant 
  24when real rates are used. This is in line with the expectation of a negative relationship 
between the yield premium attributed to callability and the nominal riskless rate rather than 
the real rate. Panel B of Table 7 shows similar results for the 01:1995-07:2001 period.  
 
***Insert Table 7 here*** 
 
We use the difference between the nominal interest rate and inflation rate as our measure 
for real yield in the above regressions
16. We find that once the real interest rate is used the 
relationship between the bond yield spread and riskless interest rate becomes insignificant 
even for AA and A indices, which are mainly composed of callable bonds. This result shows 
that once the relationship between callability and the nominal interest rate is factored out, no 
relationship remains between the interest rate and credit spread. 
To further test the robustness of our results, we use the return of Real Return Bonds 
(RRBs) issued by Government of Canada since 1991. This is a better proxy for the real 
yield.
17 We run the most comprehensive regression model - Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) - 
with rate of return on RRBs. We report both OLS and AR-GARCH results in Table 8. Once 
again, the results are very similar to those of Table 7.  
 
***Insert Table 8 here*** 
 
To sum up, irrespective of the model tested, namely the Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) 
two-factor model, Duffee’s (1998) model, or Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) comprehensive 
model, we find evidence the negative relationship between the yield spread and the 
government yield is due mainly to the effects of the call provision. Once the impact of the 
call option is removed, i.e. when considering BBB-rated economically noncallable bonds, 
the yield spread – government yield relation is not significant. When we use real government 
yields, we find that the yield spread – riskless rate relationship is insignificant for both 
  25callable and economically noncallable bonds.  
 
6   A Direct Test for Default Risk 
  In the previous section we use several well-established regression models to estimate 
the yield spread – riskless rate relation for Canadian data. Because in recent year’s bonds in 
the Canadian BBB bonds index are not exposed to callability and tax effects, it is safe to 
assume that their yield spread is mainly driven by credit risk. Moreover, BBB bonds serve as 
an excellent test case for the question of whether default risk generates a negative yield 
spread – riskless rate relation. This is because this risk is quite substantial for bonds of this 
rating category.  
We find that, when callability and tax effects are controlled for, there is no significant 
yield spread – riskless rate relation. Thus, contrary to what previous studies conclude from 
their tests (see for example: Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; and Duffee, 1998), our results 
cast doubt on one of the most notable predictions of structural models; that credit spreads are 
negatively related to the riskless rate. Recall that risk-neutral valuation is applied in the 
context of structural models. Ceteris paribus, under risk-neutral valuation an increase in the 
riskless rate implies a higher expected future value for the firm's assets relative to the default 
threshold, and a lower risk-neutral probability in default. This ultimately results in a negative 
credit spread – riskless rate relation. 
To substantiate our contention that this prediction of structural models does not hold 
empirically, in this section we offer an alternative test that involves default rates. The 
advantage of this test is in that default rates serve as a more direct measure of credit risk. 
They are also clean of callability and tax effects. We obtain historical default rates from 
Moody’s Investors Service. Moody’s historical default rates are based on the credit histories 
of nearly 10,000 corporate and sovereign entities and over 80,000 individual debt securities 
since 1970.  
We choose to apply the following Collin-Dufresne et al.’s (2001) type regression model 
  26of Equation (5) to incorporate Moody’s default rates:  
                      (8)  ε β β β β β + + ∆ + ∆ + ∆ + = ∆ I Slope Y Y DR LT LT 4 3
2
2 1 0 ) (
where ∆DR is the monthly change in Moody’s default rate and the remaining variables are as 
defined above. 
We initially assume that Moody’s trailing twelve-month all corporate default rates, serve 
as a good proxy for expected future default probabilities, and therefore use these default 
rates in regression model (6). This sample covers the 12:1979-11:2001 period. Noting that 
these are ex post default rates, we then use Moody’s monthly speculative- grade default rate 
forecasts (12:1999-11:2004), which may serve as a better proxy for expected  default 
probabilities.
18
  Note that, in 2001 81.2% of the number of defaults in Moody’s default universe 
occurred in North America (U.S. and Canada). Thus, these default rates also reflect the 
Canadian default experience. However, most of the North American defaults (77%) are those 
of U.S. companies. Thus, we also apply regression model (6) with U.S. data replacing the 
Canadian data to proxy the independent variables. Following Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001) 
we use the following proxies: the 10-year benchmark Treasury yield represents the level of 
the term structure; for the slope we use the spread between the 10-year and 2-year 
benchmark Treasury yields; and finally we use returns on the S&P 500 index. 
The results are reported in Table 9. In panel A, which reports the results using historical 
Moody’s trailing twelve-month all corporate default rates, we find that when U.S. 
determinants (term structure components and asset returns) are used, the stock index return 
coefficient is significantly negative. This is expected since higher stock returns imply higher 
asset returns and lower default rates. At the same time, the term structure variables are not 
statistically significant. When Canadian data are used instead, we find that none of the 
independent variables are statistically significant. This is also expected, since most of the 
defaults are attributed to U.S. rather than Canadian companies.  
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Recall that forecasted default rates may serve as a better proxy for expected default 
probabilities. In Panel B, we use Moody’s monthly speculative-grade default rate forecasts 
and find similar results. The results for the U.S. data are similar to the results of the historical 
default rates, except that now all coefficients are insignificant. Surprisingly, for the Canadian 
data we find a positive and significant relation between default-rate forecasts and the riskless 
rate. This is in contrast to the negative correlation found for the callable Canadian bond 
indices, and the lack of a significant relation found for the noncallable indices. 
The results in this section support our contention that the prediction of structural models 
– a negative relation between the default probabilities (and credit spreads) and the riskless 
rate – does not hold empirically. This is in contrast to the negative result found for yield 
spreads in previous studies (see for example: Longstaff and Schwartz, 1995; Duffee, 1998; 
and Collin-Dufresne et al., 2001). Our results are robust as, in contrast with yield spreads, 
default rates serve as a more direct measure of credit risk since they are free of callability 
and tax effects. 
 
7.  Summary and Conclusions 
Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) provide a model for the valuation of corporate bonds, 
which account for two stochastic factors, which accommodate the effects of interest-rates 
and the firm's asset value. One of the most notable predictions of this and other structural 
models with an asset-based default process is that credit spreads are negatively related to the 
riskless rate. Longstaff and Schwartz test this prediction along with their predicted negative 
impact of the asset factor on credit spreads using Moody’s indices and consider the negative 
relationship they find as evidence supporting their model’s prediction.  
Duffee (1998) argues that most of the bonds in Moody’s indices are callable bonds and 
thus the negative yield spread – riskless rate relation could be largely due to the negative 
  28relationship between the yield premium attributed to callability and the riskless rate. Instead, 
Duffee uses noncallable bond portfolios and finds that the negative yield spread – riskless 
rate relation is much weaker once callability is controlled. Elton et al. (2001), point out that 
Duffee’s (1998) analysis ignores the effects of state taxes on U.S. bonds, and they argue that 
differential taxes on corporate and government bonds have an important impact on corporate 
bond yield spreads.  
 Canadian corporate bond indices are devoid of tax effects since Canadian corporate and 
government bonds, unlike U.S. bonds, are subject to the same tax treatment. These indices 
also contain a call provision that allows for identifying callable and economically 
noncallable bonds. Using this Canadian bond index data, we find an insignificant yield 
spread – government yield relation for economically noncallable bonds. For bonds with an 
economically viable call option, the negative relation we find increases with the moneyness 
of the call option. Our tests of different models with both real interest rates and nominal 
interest rates, with both yield spread and real (expected) default rates, consistently show the 
robustness of our results. We conclude that call risk dominates the negative yield spread – 
government yield relation. We further conclude that, for investment-grade bonds, the role of 
the asset factor (manifesting default risk) in influencing the sensitivity of corporate bond 
yield spreads to government yields is not significant. 
  These results indicate that a gap remains in our understanding of the default process. 
Theoretically, structural models suggest that an increase in the riskless rate implies a higher 
expected future value for the firm’s asset relative to the default threshold, and a lower risk-
neutral probability of default and risk neutral credit spread. Empirically, we show that 
bondholders do not adjust their required default premium for an increase in the riskless rate. 
Our results provide support for reduced-form models that explicitly define a default hazard 
process and untie the relation between the firm’s asset value and default probability. 
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  34No. of Mean of Std. Dev. Of Mean of Std. Dev. Of
Observations Credit Spread Credit Spread Relative Spread Relative Spread
AAA 200 0.5761 0.3050 1.0559 0.0331
AA 300 0.6350 0.3184 1.0716 0.0434
A 300 0.8612 0.3533 1.0980 0.0548
BBB 300 1.5359 0.7916 1.1842 0.1266
Table 1
Summary Statistics for Yield Spreads in SCM Long-Term Corporate Bond Indices for the 
August 1976 to July 2001 Period
The yield spread is the difference between the yield on a long-term index and the yield on the
constant maturity, long-term Government of Canada index. The relative spread is the ratio of
the yield on a long-term index to the yield on the constant maturity, long-term Government of
Canada index. Data for the AAA indices are available only until March 1993. 
  35Index a b c R
2
AAA 0.0057 -0.1447 -0.6796 0.10
(0.39) (-4.66) (-2.21)
AA 0.0026 -0.1538 -0.6808 0.11
(0.24) (-5.86) (-3.02)
A 0.0043 -0.1513 -0.7903 0.12
(0.41) (-5.99) (-3.65)
BBB 0.0086 -0.1892 -1.0957 0.08
(0.53 ) (-4.77) (-3.22)
Index a b c R
2
AAA N/A
AA -0.0041 -0.2106 -0.6623 0.14
(-0.27) (-3.12) (-2.26)
A 0.0015 -0.1927 -0.6160 0.13
(0.10) (-3.02) (-2.22)
BBB 0.0022 0.0442 -1.2557 0.11
(0.10) (0.44) (-2.87)
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Table 2 reports the results of the OLS estimation of regression model (1). This regression
model is of the following form: 
∆S = a + b∆Y + cI + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the yield spread:the difference between the yield on 
the relevant SCM index and that of the constant maturity, long-term Government of 
Canada index, ∆Y is the monthly change in the yield of the constant maturity, long-term 
Government of Canada index, and I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
300 index. t-values are in parentheses. Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample,
covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are 
dominated by corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the
results for the 01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call 
are expected to dominate all indices. 
Table 2
Regressions of Changes in the Yield Spread of SCM Long-Term Corporate Bond 
Indices on Changes in the Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-Term Government of 
Canada Index and the Return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 Index - OLS 
Estimation
Table 2 reports the results of the OLS estimation of regression model (1) in which the
dependent variable is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread. This regression
model is of the following form: 
∆S = a + b∆Y + cI + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread, ∆Y is the monthly change in 
the yield of the constant maturity, long-term Government of Canada index, and I is the 
monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index. t-values are in parentheses. 
Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year 
period. Data during this sample period are dominated by corporate bonds carrying a
standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the 01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, 
in which bonds carrying the doomsday call are expected to dominate all indices. 
Table 2
Regressions of Changes in Absolute Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate 
Bond Indices on Changes in the Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-Term 
Government of Canada Index and the Return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 











  36Index a b c R
2
AAA 0.0007 -0.1927 -0.0553 0.16
(0.59) (-6.16) (-2.26)
AA 0.0005 -0.2304 -0.0801 0.17
(0.44) (-7.76) (-3.56)
A 0.0007 -0.2573 -0.0889 0.22
(0.68) (-9.09) (-4.15)
BBB 0.0013 -0.3778 -0.1247 0.14
(0.66) (-6.84) (-2.98)
Index a b c R
2
AAA N/A
AA -0.0002 -0.3294 -0.1266 0.23
(-0.08) (-4.42) (-2.69)
A 0.0006 -0.3502 -0.1214 0.25
(0.25) (-4.83) (-2.65)
BBB 0.0009 -0.2879 -0.2223 0.14
(0.23) (-2.48) (-3.04)
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Table 3
Regressions of Changes in Relative Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate 
Bond Indices on Percentage Changes in the Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-
Term Government of Canada Index and the Return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
300 Index - OLS Estimation
Table 3 reports the results of the OLS estimation of regression model (2) in which the
dependent variable is the monthly change in the relative yield spread. This regression
model is of the following form: 
∆R = a + b∆PY + cI + ε, 
where  ∆R is the monthly change in the relative yield spread, ∆PY is the monthly 
percentage change in the yield of the constant maturity, long-term Government of Canada 
index, and I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index. t-values are 
in parentheses. Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample, covering the 08:1976-
07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are dominated by corporate bonds
carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the 01:1995-07:2001 
sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call are expected to dominate all
indices. 
  37Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA -0.0027 -0.0442 -0.0806 1, 2, 4 1 1 <0.0001 0.19 <0.0001
(-0.51) (-2.51) (-4.25)
AA -0.0074 -0.1231 -0.1893 1, 2, 4 1 1 0.0005 0.18 <0.0001
(-1.82) (-8.72) (-12.56)
A -0.0063 -0.1011 -0.1514 1, 2 1 1 0.0001 0.16 <0.0001
(-1.13) (-6.22) (-8.16)
BBB 0.0025 -0.1244 -0.1996 - 1 1 <0.0001 0.09 -
(0.18) (-3.26) (-4.72)
Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA N/A
AA -0.0076 -0.1732 -0.1751 - - - - 0.08 -
(-0.48) (-2.34) (-2.44)
A -0.0016 -0.1519 -0.1645 - - - - 0.08 -
(-0.11) (-2.17) (-2.42)
BBB -0.0037 0.1361 0.0947 - - - - 0.02 -
(-0.15) (1.21) (0.87)
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Table 4
Regressions of Changes in Absolute Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term 
Corporate Bond Indices on Changes in Government of Canada Yields -
AR-GARCH Estimation
Table 4 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (3) in 
which the dependent variable is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread. This
regression model is of the following form: 
∆S = β0 + β1∆YT-bill + β2∆Slope + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread, ∆YT-bill is the monthly 
change in the three-month Treasury Bill yield, and  ∆Slope is the monthly change in the 
spread between the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index and the 
three-month Treasury bill yield. t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the 
autoregressive process as determined by the stepwise autoregression method, p and q 
are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. Test gives the p-value for the normality test 
for detecting misspecification of the GARCH model, and finally LM gives the p-value 
for the Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample,
covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are 
dominated by corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the
results for the 01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call 
are expected to dominate all indices.  
 
  38Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA -0.0101 -0.1547 0.0614 -0.0887 -0.0055 1, 2, 4 1 1 <0.0001 0.22 0.0004
(-1.51) (-11.06) (3.80) (-7.40) (-3.61)
AA -0.0063 -0.1196 0.0429 -0.0679 -0.0050 1, 2, 4 1 1 0.0018 0.23 0.0067
(-1.47) (-9.67) (4.40) (-6.90) (-4.68)
A -0.0067 -0.1208 0.0600 -0.0541 -0.0058 1, 2 1 1 0.0021 0.20 <0.0001
(-1.07) (-8.86) (5.59) (-5.06) (-4.66)
BBB 0.0029 -0.1467 0.0447 -0.0701 -0.0109 - 1 1 <0.0001 0.15 -
(0.21) (-3.82) (1.58) (-2.67) (-3.30)
Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA N/A
AA -0.0154 -0.1676 0.2605 -0.0041 -0.0070 - - - - 0.16 -
(-0.85) (-2.02) (1.31) (-0.08) (-2.31)
A -0.0001 -0.1817 0.0541 -0.0041 -0.0063 - - - - 0.13 -
(-0.00) (-2.29) (0.29) (-0.08) (-2.17)
BBB 0.0047 0.0510 -0.0081 0.0141 -0.0132 - - - - 0.16 -
(0.14) (0.43) (-0.03) (0.18) (-3.03)
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
    Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Table 5
Regressions of Changes in Nominal Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate Bond Indices on 
Changes in Selected Nominal Determinants -
AR-GARCH Estimation
Table 5 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (4) in which the dependent 
variable is the monthly change in the nominal yield spread. This regression model is of the following
form: 
∆S = β0 + β1∆YLT + β2 (∆YLT)
 2 + β3∆Slope + β4I + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the nominal yield spread, ∆YLT is the monthly change in the nominal 
yield on the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index, (∆YLT)
2 is a convexity term, 
∆Slope is the monthly change in the nominal spread between the constant maturity long-term Government 
of Canada index and the three-month Treasury bill yield, and I is the monthly nominal return on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index. t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the autoregressive
process as determined by the stepwise autoregression method, p and q are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, 
Norm. Test gives the p-value for the normality test for detecting misspecification of the GARCH model,
and finally LM gives the p-value for the Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the estimates for the 
entire sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are 
dominated by corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the
01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call are expected to dominate all
indices.  
 
  39        Regression Coefficient
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 mpq Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA -0.0012 -0.2232 -0.1801 1,4 1 1 <0.0001 0.14 <.0001
(-0.15) (-8.02) (-8.47)
AA -0.0036 -0.1542 -0.1350 1, 2, 4 1 1 <0.0001 0.16 <.0001
(-0.8) (-6.74) (-9.03)
A -0.0049 -0.1527 -0.1204 1, 2 1 1 0.0003 0.14 <0.0001
(-0.82) (-5.99) (-7.11)
BBB 0.0018 -0.1822 -0.1454 - 1 1 <0.0001 0.07 -
(-0.13) (-3.22) (-3.83)
Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 mpq Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA N/A
AA -0.0079 -0.2082 -0.1778 - - - - 0.08 -
(-0.5) (-2.33) (-2.62)
A -0.0021 -0.1916 -0.1629 - - - - 0.08 -
(-0.14) (-2.27) (-2.53)
BBB -0.0045 0.1266 0.1143 - - - - 0.16 -
(-0.19) (-0.93) (-1.11)
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
  AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
Table 6
Regressions of Changes in Absolute Nominal Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate 
Bond Indices on Changes in the Real Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-Term Government 
of Canada Index and on Changes in the Monthly Inflation Rate
Table 6 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (5). This regression 
model is of the following form: 
∆S = β0 + β1∆Inf + β2∆YLT + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the nominal yield spread, ∆YLT is the monthly change in the real 
yield on the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index, ∆Inf is the monthly change 
in the inflation rate. t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the autoregressive process as 
determined by the stepwise autoregression method, p and q are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. 
Test gives the p-value for the normality test for detecting misspecification of the GARCH model,
and finally LM gives the p-value for the Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the estimates for
the entire sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are 
dominated by corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the
01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call are expected to dominate 
all indices.  
  40Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA -0.0041 0.0019 0.0002 -0.0418 -0.0005 1, 2 1 1 <0.0001 0.15 <.0001
(-0.55) (0.13) (0.02) (-3.06) (-0.31)
AA -0.0040 -0.0178 0.0052 -0.0706 -0.0040 1, 2, 4 1 1 <.0001 0.19 0.0005
(-0.71) (-1.36) (0.66) (-5.91) (-2.90)
A -0.0032 0.0005 0.0044 -0.0571 -0.0034 1, 2 1 1 0.0012 0.15 <.0001
(-0.52) (0.04) (0.58) (-4.28) (-2.81)
BBB -0.0022 -0.0029 0.0208 -0.0818 -0.0078 - 1 1 <0.0001 0.11 -
(-0.15) (-0.21) (1.38) (-3.10) (-2.38)
Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA N/A
AA -0.0180 -0.0104 0.1060 -0.0453 -0.0044 - - - - 0.16 -
(-1.15) (-0.29) (2.19) (-0.98) (-1.49)
A -0.0115 -0.0130 0.0927 -0.0503 -0.0042 - - - - 0.10 -
(-0.64) (-0.37) (1.89) (-1.05) (-1.45)
BBB -0.0185 0.0465 0.0997 -0.0131 -0.0122 - - - - 0.13 -
(-0.68) (0.86) (1.33) (-0.18) (-2.77)
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Table 7
Regressions of Changes in Real Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate Bond Indices on Changes 
in Selected Real Determinants -
AR-GARCH Estimation
Table 7 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (4) in which the dependent 
variable is the monthly change in the real yield spread. This regression model is of the following form: 
∆S = β0 + β1∆YLT + β2(∆YLT,R)
2 + β3∆Slope + β4I + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the real yield spread, ∆YLT,R is the monthly change in the real yield on the 
constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index, (∆YLT,R)
2 is a convexity term, ∆Slope  is the 
monthly change in the real spread between the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index and 
the three-month Treasury bill yield, and I is the monthly real return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 
index. t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the autoregressive process as determined by the 
stepwise autoregression method, p and q are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. Test gives the p-value for 
the normality test for detecting misspecification of the GARCH model, and finally LM gives the p-value for 
the Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample, covering the 08:1976-
07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are dominated by corporate bonds carrying a
standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the 01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds 
carrying the doomsday call are expected to dominate all indices. 
  41Index β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 R
2
AA -0.0057 -0.0491 0.4723 -0.1030 -0.0058 - - - - 0.16
(-0.39) (-0.18) (1.35) (-3.86) (-1.97)
A 0.0052 -0.0200 -0.0047 -0.0856 -0.0051 - - - - 0.13
(0.38) (-0.23) (-0.01) (-3.48) (-1.87)
BBB 0.0219 0.0288 -0.7100 -0.2510 -0.0074 - - - - 0.13
(0.59) (0.11) (-0.81) (-3.74) (-0.99)
Regression Coefficients
Index β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mp q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AA -0.0042 0.0389 0.4067 -0.0988 -0.0051 1,2 - - - 0.23 0.0005
(-0.41) (0.41) (1.31) (-4.19) (-1.86)
A 0.0074 0.0073 -0.1152 -0.0904 -0.0047 1 -- - 0.17 0.0023
(0.66) (0.08) (-0.38) (-3.75) (-1.81)
BBB 0.0219 0.0288 -0.7100 -0.2510 -0.0074 - - - - 0.18 -
(0.59) (0.11) (-0.81) (-3.74) (-0.99)
     Panel A:   12:1991-07:2001 OLS
     Panel B:   12:1991-07:2001 AR-GARCH
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
Table 8
Regressions of Changes in Absolute Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate Bond Indices on 
Changes in RRBs and Other Seclected Determinants
Table 8 reports the results of both OLS and AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (4) in which the 
dependent variable is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread. This regression model is of the
following form: 
∆S = β0 + β1∆YLT + β2(∆YLT)
2 + β3∆Slope + β4I + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread, ∆YLT is the monthly yield change on the long-
term Government of Canada Real Return Bonds (RBBs), (∆YLT)
2 is a convexity term, ∆Slope is the monthly 
change in the spread between the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada index and the three-
month Treasury bill yield, and I is the monthly real return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index. t-
values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the autoregressive process as determined by the stepwise 
autoregression method, p  and q  are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. Test gives the p-value for the 
normality test for detecting misspecification of the GARCH model, and finally LM gives the p-value for the 
Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the OLS estimates for AA, A, BBB bonds, covering the 12:1991-
07:2001 11-year period. Panel B reports the AR-GARCH estimates for AA, A, BBB bonds, covering the 
12:1991-07:2001 11-year period.  
 
 
  42Regression Coefficients
Countries β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mpq Norm. Test R
2 LM
U.S. 0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0050 1,2 0 1 <0.0001 0.16 0.0070
(1.35) (-0.27) (-0.36) (0.44) (-2.72)
Canada 0.0001 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002 0.0000 1 1 1 <0.0001 0.13 0.0050
(0.73) (0.14) (0.16) (1.25) (0.36)
Regression Coefficients
Countries β 0 β 1 β 2 β 3 β 4 mpq Norm. Test R
2 LM
U.S. -0.0009 -0.0020 0.0070 0.0040 0.0080 - - - - 0.05 -
(-1.07) (-0.78) (1.031) (1.04) (0.64)
Canada -0.0009 0.0037 0.0240 0.0006 -0.0007 - - - - 0.13 -
(-3.21) (2.35) (4.57) (0.73) (-0.12)
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
     Panel A:   01:1980-12:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:2000-09:2004
Table 9
Regressions of Changes in Default Rate of Corporate Bonds on Changes in Selected Nominal 
Determinants -
AR-GARCH Estimation
Table 9 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (6) in which the dependent 
variable is the monthly change in the default rates from Moody’s. This regression model is of the
following form: 
∆DR = β0 + β1∆YLT + β2 (∆YLT)
 2 + β3∆Slope + β4I + ε, 
where ∆DR is the monthly change in the default rates, ∆YLT is the monthly change in the nominal yield on 
the constant maturity long-term Government of Canada (U.S.) index, (∆YLT)
2 is a convexity term, ∆Slope 
is the monthly change in the nominal spread between the constant maturity long-term Government of 
Canada (U.S.) index and the three-month Treasury bill yield, and I is the monthly nominal return on the 
Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index (U.S. S&P 500 index). t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree 
of the autoregressive process as determined by the stepwise autoregression method, p and q are the 
GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. Test gives the p-value for the normality test for detecting 
misspecification of the GARCH model, and finally LM gives the p-value for the Lagrange multiplier test. 
Panel A reports the estimates for historical tracing default rates of all North-American corporate bonds, 
covering the 01:1980-12:2001 22 year period. Panel B outlines the results for the 01:2000-09:2004 
period, in which forecasted default rates for only speculative bonds are used as dependent variables.  
  43Regression Coefficients
Index a b c m p q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA 0.0007 -0.0563 -0.0302 1, 2 1 1 <0.0001 0.19 0.0004
(0.12) (-3.27) (-0.20)
AA 0.0006 -0.1428 -0.4287 1, 2, 4 1 1 <0.0001 0.18 0.0006
(0.12) (-9.67) (-4.02)
A 0.0003 -0.1346 -0.5162 1, 2 1 1 <0.0001 0.19 <0.0001
(0.05) (-8.88) (-4.26)
BBB 0.0098 -0.1641 -1.2119 1, 2 - - - 0.12 -
(0.81) (-4.37) (-3.76)
Regression Coefficients
Index a b c m p q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA N/A
AA -0.0041 -0.2106 -0.6623 - - - - 0.14 -
(-0.27) (-3.12) (-2.26)
A 0.0015 -0.1927 -0.6160 - - - - 0.13 -
(0.10) (-3.02) (-2.22)
BBB 0.0026 0.0578 -1.3416 3 - - - 0.17 -
(0.09) (0.58) (-3.26)
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters
AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Goodness of Fit
Table A.1
Regressions of Changes in the Yield Spread of SCM Long-Term Corporate Bond 
Indices on Changes in the Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-Term 
Government of Canada Index and the Return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 
300 Index - AR-GARCH Estimation
Table A.1 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (1).
This regression model is of the following form: 
∆S = a + b∆Y + cI + ε, 
where ∆S is the monthly change in the yield spread: the difference between the yield
on the relevant SCM index and that of the constant maturity, long-term Government
of Canada index, ∆Y is the monthly change in the yield of the constant maturity, long-
term Government of Canada index, and I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock
Exchange 300 index. t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the
autoregressive process as determined by the stepwise autoregression method, p and q
are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. Test gives the p-value for the normality test
for detecting misspecification of the GARCH model, and finally LM gives the p-value
for the Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample,
covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are
dominated by corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the
results for the 01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday
call are expected to dominate all indices. 
Table A.1
Regressions of Changes in Absolute Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term 
Corporate Bond Indices on Changes in the Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-
Term Government of Canada Index and the Return on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange 300 Index - AR-GARCH Estimation
Table A.1 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (1) in 
which the dependent variable is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread. This
regression model is of the following form: 
∆S = a + b∆Y + cI + ε, 
where  ∆S is the monthly change in the absolute yield spread, ∆Y is the monthly 
change in the yield of the constant maturity, long-term Government of Canada index, 
and I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index. t-values are in
parentheses, m gives the degree of the autoregressive process as determined by the 
stepwise autoregression method, p and q are the GARCH(p,q) parameters, Norm. Test
gives the p-value for the normality test for detecting misspecification of the GARCH
model, and finally LM gives the p-value for the Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A 
reports the estimates for the entire sample, covering the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year
period. Data during this sample period are dominated by corporate bonds carrying a
standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the 01:1995-07:2001 sub-
period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call are expected to dominate all
indices.  
 
  44Regression Coefficients
Index a b c m p q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA 0.0002 -0.1510 -0.0193 1, 2 1 1 0.0005 0.24 0.0003
(0.28) (-8.52) (-1.53)
AA 0.0004 -0.1541 -0.0589 1, 2 1 1 <0.0001 0.21 0.0057
(0.90) (-7.89) (-4.62)
A 0.0002 -0.2169 -0.0561 1, 2 1 1 <0.0001 0.26 0.0037
(0.29) (-12.98 ) (-3.91)
BBB 0.0013 -0.3778 -0.1247 - - - - 0.14 -
(0.66) (-6.84) (-2.98)
Regression Coefficients
Index a b c m p q Norm. Test R
2 LM
AAA N/A
AA -0.0002 -0.3294 -0.1266 - - - - 0.23 -
(-0.08) (-4.42) (-2.69)
A 0.0006 -0.3502 -0.1214 - - - - 0.25 -
(0.25) (-4.83) (-2.65)
BBB 0.0012 -0.2404 -0.2398 3 - - - 0.20 -
(0.24) (-2.07) (-3.49)
AR and GARCH Parameters Goodness of Fit
     Panel A:   09:1976-07:2001
AR and GARCH Parameters
     Panel B:   01:1995-07:2001
Table A.2
Regressions of Changes in Relative Yield Spreads of SCM Long-Term Corporate 
Bond Indices on Percentage Changes in the Yield of the Constant Maturity Long-
Term Government of Canada Index and the Return on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange 300 Index - AR-GARCH Estimation
Table A.2 reports the results of the AR-GARCH estimation of regression model (2) in 
which the dependent variable is the monthly change in the relative yield spread. This
regression model is of the following form: 
∆R = a + b∆PY + cI + ε, 
where  ∆R is the monthly change in the relative yield spread, ∆PY is the monthly
percentage change in the yield of the constant maturity, long-term Government of
Canada index, and I is the monthly return on the Toronto Stock Exchange 300 index.
t-values are in parentheses, m gives the degree of the autoregressive process as 
determined by the stepwise autoregression method, p and  q are the GARCH(p,q)
parameters, Norm. Test gives the p-value for the normality test for detecting
misspecification of the GARCH model, and finally LM gives the p-value for the
Lagrange multiplier test. Panel A reports the estimates for the entire sample, covering
the 08:1976-07:2001 25-year period. Data during this sample period are dominated by
corporate bonds carrying a standard call provision. Panel B outlines the results for the
01:1995-07:2001 sub-period, in which bonds carrying the doomsday call are expected 
to dominate all indices.  
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Figure 1. Moneyness of the doomsday call provision. To determine
the moneyness of the doomsday call provision, we compare the
doomsday spread to the yield spread. Based on a sample of doomsday
spreads of long bonds for each month during the 01:1993-12:1999
period, for each rating category, we plot the yield spread on the
corresponding long-term index (S), the average doomsday spread (µ),
the average doomsday spread plus one standard deviation (µ+σ), and 





















Noncallable Doomsday Call Standard Call
Figure 2. Distribution of Canadian Corporate Bonds Based on
Callability (Percentages), 01:1993 - 12:1999. For each month during
the sampled 7-year period we count the number of corporate bonds
issued with a doomsday call provision, the number of bonds issued with 
a standard call provision, and the number of noncallable bonds, as
reported in the Financial Post Corporate Bond Record. In the Figure we
plot the proportion of each of the above categories calculated with
respect to the total number of bonds within each month. 
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1 For example see Merton, (1974) Black and Cox (1976) and Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) and Ericsson 
and Renault (forthcoming). 
2 Duffee (1998) notes that there are tax effects arising from the different tax rates, which apply for U.S. 
corporate and Treasury bonds. However, using U.S. bond data, he is unable to control for the impact of the 
tax differential. 
3 Batten, Hogan, and Jacoby (2005) use a sample of noncallable Australian Eurobonds and find evidence 
supporting the predictions of the two-factor Longstaff and Schwartz model. Nonetheless the preference by 
international investors for the with-holding tax exempt yields of Eurobonds may distort the pricing 
relationship between high credit quality Eurobonds and Government bonds. 
4 According to Duffee, following a given rise in Treasury yields, everything else being equal, the yield on 
a corporate bond will have to increase by a higher rate, so that the after-tax yield spread will remain 
unchanged. This implies that the pre-tax yield spread will widen following an increase in Treasury yields. 
5 The reader may refer to Jacoby and Roberts (2003) for a detailed description of the SCM indices. 
6 Mann and Powers (2003) refer to the make-whole call provision as “a recent innovation in the public 
debt markets.”  
7 Note that there is still a small probability that a BBB-rated bond will be upgraded in the future and that 
its doomsday call will be in-the-money. However, given the small rate of upgrades, the expected value of 
this state is trivial. 
8 In a small number of cases, the cross-sectional standard deviation of the doomsday spread is zero, which 
implies: µ = µ+σ = µ+2σ. This is due to a small number of bonds available during the given month, 
usually issued by the same company, all sharing the same doomsday spread. In other cases, specifically in 
the 06:1993-07:1994 period, the reported doomsday spread for BBB-rated bonds is zero. 
9 Note that since our sample is not stratified into different sectors, there is no need in the current study to 
use sector-specific stock indices as in Longstaff and Schwartz (1995). 
10 Longstaff and Schwartz (1995) estimate their regression models using OLS. As previously noted, we 
find that a combined autoregressive and GARCH (1,1) model fits our data best. However, the qualitative 
results turn out to be similar irrespective of the estimation procedure used. Thus, for the sake of 
comparison with Longstaff and Schwartz (1995), our focus in the discussion of regression models (1) and 
(2) is on the results of the OLS estimation, which are presented in the tables below. The results of the 
combined autoregressive and GARCH (1,1) regressions are reported in the appendix.   
11 The estimated coefficient b for the BBB index under the Yule-Walker estimation is also statistically 
insignificant. Thus, this result is robust. 
12 A higher probability of a call for corporate bonds carrying the doomsday call provision reduces their 
effective duration, or price sensitivity to changes in the riskless rate. This implies that following an 
upward shift in the riskless rate, the corporate bond yield will rise by a lower rate, and yield spreads will 
contract. 
13 Note that we obtain the same result for the BBB index when the Yule-Walker procedure is applied. 
14 In analyzing the results, note that one's conclusions are insensitive to whether one uses OLS or the 
estimation method we apply here. 
15 Our results are different from those in Collin-Dufresne et al. (2001). This may be due to the fact that 
their data, devoid of callability, still suffer from the coupon bias which may generate the observed 
negative relationship for noncallable bonds. 
16 We adopt the same approach as Jorion and Goetzmann (2000) Table 1. 
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17 Interested readers can obtain more information on RRBs from Bank of Canada website.  
18 Moody’s speculative-grade default rate forecasts are generated with a Poisson regression model, with 
the independent variables that proxy changes in credit quality, an aging effect (to reflect the changing 
nature of default risk with the time that elapsed since issuance), and macroeconomic variables. For details 
see Keenan, Sobehart, and Hamilton (1999). We thank David Hamilton for providing us the time series of 
the speculative-grade default rate forecast. 
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